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Our Knowledge of God: Essays on Natural and Philosophical Theology. Kelly 
James Clark, editor. Dordrect: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1992. Pp. 
vi and 230. $99.00 (cloth). 
MARK McLEOD, University of Texas at San Antonio 
Our Knowledge of God, as a descriptive title for this somewhat disconnected 
collection of essays, is in one way misleading. Only half the book's essays 
deal with the rationality of belief in God, and only one directly with 
knowledge of God. The remaining essays cover various aspects of God's 
nature, eternal punishment, and theological methodology. Perhaps the 
somewhat disparate connection of these essays reflects the fact that a 
number of them derive from a conference held at Gordon College. Invited 
papers are often open-ended with regard to their content. 
On the other hand, the essays on the whole certainly add to our 
knowledge of God and his attributes, or in some cases, add to how we 
should approach the topic of God or belief in God. I shall comment on a 
number of the essays, leaving the others to the reader. 
Norman Kretzmann's, "Evidence Against Anti-Evidentialism" argues 
that Plantinga's anti-evidentialism is not incompatible with evidential-
ism, unless the latter is construed in an unnatural and unhistorical way. 
He further argues that evidentialism is not rooted in foundationalism 
but, in fact, that the form is logically, psychologically, and probably func-
tionally prior to foundationism. Kretzmann rightly notes that Plantinga 
has narrowed the notion of evidence so as to exclude the kinds of 
grounds that are not propositional. The goal of Plantinga's project, then, 
is just to show that belief in God can be properly basic on grounds that 
classical foundationalism traditionally has rejected. The most important 
issue Kretzmann raises is the distinction between rationality as support of 
a belief and rationality as the generation of a belief. He uses this to argue 
that Planting a ignores the issue of occurent beliefs as grounds for the 
belief in God. The upshot of Kretzmann's discussion is that "Plantinga's 
project yields not so much theism without evidence as see-no-evidence 
theism." (31) In this I think Kretzmann is right on the mark. 
Alvin Plantinga's contribution, "Epistemic Probability and Evil," 
combines his earlier claims that belief in God is properly basic and that 
evil is not a defeater for a belief in God, thus reemphasizing that there 
are non propositional grounds for theistic belief. First Plantinga consid-
ers various accounts of probability and finds them wanting simply in 
regard to being successful accounts of probability. But worse is the fact 
that if any of these extant theories of probability is true, then "there 
seems to be no way to develop an atheological probabilistic problem 
from evil." (p. 50). 
This essay is characteristically Plantinga and in some senses contains 
little that is not present in his other essays. Nevertheless it does draw 
out in a fuller fashion some important topics. The main one is that some 
issues that appear to be neutral about religious or ontological matters 
are ultimately not neutral about those concerns. I agree but on different 
grounds. Plantinga rejects the claim that all evidence is propositional 
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and he rejects coherence as sufficient for rationality. However, as I've 
argued elsewhere, it's not clear that Plantinga's suggestions about prop-
er basicality or warrant as proper function can really get away from a 
holist position on rationality. In fact, that the starting point for epistemic 
theories is largely an ontological issue plays into the holist's hand. Of 
course theists may coherently reject the probabilistic argument from 
evil. But that the theist may consistently do so does not show us which 
ontological starting point is the correct one and that, it seems to me, is 
the real issue. 
Peter Forrest, in "Reference and the Refutation of Naturalism," argues 
that "Naturalism fails when it comes to reference, and that the way it 
fails provides some indirect support for the claim that human beings can 
have a non-sentential, inarticulate knowledge of God, prior to reason-
ing." His argument is this. If Naturalism is true, then reference is gross-
ly underdetermined but, since reference is not underdetermined, 
Naturalism is false. His basic stand against the gross underdetermina-
han of reference is that we have a piece of not essentially sentential 
knowledge which we express by saying that we know what it is for a 
class to be objectively natural. The naturalness here extends to far dis-
tant points of the universe-that is, what is a cow here is a cow any-
where. The "not essentially sentential knowledge" ultimately cannot be 
accepted by Naturalists since for the Naturalist, all nontheoretical 
knowledge is restricted to what can be observed. Gross underdetermi-
nation commits us to possibly many interpretations of a reference, e.g., 
cows as the animals observable in the field and bits of empty space 1 mil-
lion miles from the field. Yet we rely on our claim that we know what it 
is for a class to be objectively natural. Since many of the alternative ref-
erences are not observable, reference cannot be grossly underdeter-
mined. Naturalism, taken as a positive way of understanding the world 
(and not merely skepticism), cannot give us an understanding of things 
rather than merely beliefs, for reference ultimately fails to pick things 
out. Forrest suggests, then, that we do have a non-sensory-like knowl-
edge of natural kinds and that the acceptance of this knowledge opens 
the door to the sensus divinitatus-a non-sensory-like means to the 
knowledge of God. 
This essay is an interesting argument for the possibility of knowing 
God and for the rejection of Naturalism. It is strongest in its argument 
against Naturalism. Nevertheless it is not clear why the Naturalist 
should be upset over not explaining things rather than mere beliefs, so 
long as beliefs can be explained in non-personal terms, which is precise-
ly what the Naturalist thinks can be done. Put another way, does a 
Naturalist have to be a realist? No. But why then take Naturalism to be 
a positive explanation of things (reality?) rather than just one interpreta-
tion of the universe among many-which seems compatible with gross 
undetermination? While I may not have done justice to Forrest's essay, 
it seems that some of the big issues behind the debate between 
Naturalism and Supernaturalism over reference and realism/ anti-real-
ism need to be dealt with at greater length. 
William P. Alston's, "The Place of Experience in the Grounds of 
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Religious Belief" argues that putative experiences of God are (or can be) 
shored up by other sources of justification so that "although each can be 
questioned and none renders any of one's beliefs absolutely certain, they 
lend support to each other as well as to the beliefs they are invoked to 
support; so that in the way the whole assemblage fits together we have 
sufficient reason to take the beliefs to be true" (p. 110). This position, 
and the essay in which it is explained, naturally extend the position on 
religious experience that Alston has developed over the past two 
decades. I have only one issue to raise, which I discuss elsewhere at 
greater length. Does Alston's moderate foundationalism give enough of 
a place to coherentist considerations in the "interpretation" of theistic 
experience? I believe notl. 
In "Revelation" Richard Swinburne examines whether we have rea-
son to expect a revelation of propositional truth about God, what such a 
revelation would be like, and what kind of historical evidence would 
show that we have got it. Given non-revealed evidence for God's exis-
tence, says Swinburne, one should expect a revelation from God about 
various things, including how humans can move into sainthood. Such a 
revelation could not be, for logical as well as empirical reasons, culture-
free or presuppositionless. Instead, such a revelation would be cultural-
ly rooted but God would also provide a means of guidance for extract-
ing the truth out of this culturally rooted revelation. Furthermore, we 
can evaluate the revelation by two tests. First, does it cohere with our 
overall philosophical and moral view? Second, is it attended by some 
supernatural events-the miraculous? 
Swinburne's argument turns, it seems to me, on a controversial issue. 
He argues that it is plausible to believe that there is only one atonement 
sufficing for the whole human race. "So any revelation of that atone-
ment must have enough connection with the century and culture in 
which it took place for the report of it to be comprehensible. And that 
means that there cannot be totally separate revelations for different cen-
turies and cultures. Or at least [this is] an argument for one final (his 
emphasis) major revelation, reporting that atonement." (p.119) What 
hangs on this is the claim that there is one (final) Christian revelation. 
But I don't see how Swinburne's argument works. One would think, on 
Swinburne's a priori grounds, that God would reveal the atonement to 
each and every culture and century-just the reverse of what Swinburne 
claims. 
Nicholas Wolterstorffs "Divine Simplicity" argues that in order to 
understand the medieval doctrine of God's simplicity we must imagina-
tively enter into the medieval's ontological style--constituent ontology 
rather than our relational ontology. For the medieval "everything is a 
nature" rather than our "everything has a nature." God is simple, then, 
in not being complex. God is not accidental. The upshot of this, says 
Wolterstorff, is that our puzzlement about certain identity claims the 
medievals made about God (e.g., God's existence is not distinct from his 
essence) disappears. What we should concentrate on is not the doctrine 
of simplicity but rather the issues arising from the medieval's ontologi-
cal style. I have only one question here. Is this just a matter of style? Or 
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perhaps better, what has Wolterstorff in mind when he talks about style? 
The difference between a constituent and a relational ontology seems to 
involve more than a difference in style. 
Kelly James Clark adds his "Hold Not Thy Peace at My Tears" to the 
collection. This essay is a reflection on theological methodology in 
which Clark argues that there is an impasse between two accounts of 
God's relationship to suffering. First, there is divine impassibility which 
rests on tradition, a Platonizing metaphysics and Scripture. Second 
there is a dynamic view which rests on religious experience, intuitions, 
feminine understandings of the divine, socio-political reflection and 
Scripture. Clark's thesis is that inference to the best explanation is a way 
out of the impasse, and he comes down on the side of dynamism-even 
though this raises important and deep issues about divine ontology. 
While I believe Clark is right in his suggestion here-inference to the 
best explanation is the most plausible way to settle these differences-
I'm not entirely sanguine. I have two concerns. First, running through 
this essay is the goal of discussing theological method and yet it is 
focused on one issue alone. That issue is, of course, an important one, 
but the suggested solution to the impasse leaves open other ontological 
questions. Won't these in turn need a theological methodology to sort 
out the issues? Won't we perhaps be back to square one? And second, 
while inference to the best explanation may be useful where theological 
conflict arises, is it the method we should use in less controversial areas 
of theological research? 
Marilyn McCord Adams' contribution "Julian of Norwich on The 
Tender Loving Care of Mother Jesus" argues that God leaves us in cer-
tain kinds of ignorance and that these are acceptable given the right 
views of child-development. We are, in ways, like children. In her 
insightful way, McCord Adams leads us to think in pastoral but philo-
sophically deep ways about God's care. 
Her emphasis, following Julian, on sin as shame and incompetence is 
very helpful and I think it would serve the Christian community well if 
more philosophers would explore the nature of sin. The relationship 
between sin and ignorance in particular is one needing explanation. It 
was, after all, the tree of the knowledge of good and evil. 
George N. Schlesinger, in "The Scope of Human Autonomy" argues 
that perhaps human freedom should be seen as a basis for eternal life in 
that freedom is so important that its consequences are eternal. As such, 
humans may not face punishment for past sin but rather have the 
amount of heavenly virtue attained to be up to us. Alternatively, there 
may be punishment but it, and its attendant difficulties, are justified by 
the greatly enhanced role of human autonomy. 
Schlesinger's thoughts here are attractive for a number of reasons. 
First, his emphasis on freedom leaves open a faithfulness to the main 
traditions in Christianity with regard to eternal punishment while also 
providing some account which ameliorates the horror of that tradition. 
Second, and more important, is the openness to the future and to future 
development implied in his suggestions. As a child I worried that heav-
en might be terribly dull-after all, we would all have the same goals 
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and purposes. But perhaps in our full autonomy, we will develop and 
grow even more in the afterlife than we could ever possibly do in the 
mundane. 
Our Knowledge of God is a collection of good essays, but it is not a good 
collection of essays. One would enjoy a collection with more thematic 
unity and a few less typographical errors. Nevertheless, the essays are, 
by and large, well worth the read. 
NOTES 
1. See my Rationality and Theistic Belief. 
Faith in Theory and Practice: Essays on Justifying Religious Belief. Elizabeth S. 
Radcliffe and Carol J. White, editors. Chicago and LaSalle, IL: Open 
Court Publishing Co., 1993. Pp. xix and 235. $34.95 (cloth; $16.95 (paper). 
LAURA GARCIA, Rutgers University. 
This collection derives from a 1991 conference held at Santa Clara 
University on the topic of the epistemology of religious belief. The edi-
tors provide a helpful introduction with a brief description of each essay 
and an explication of the principle of unity they find running through-
out the book: "Faith can be seen as not just a set of beliefs but a special 
way of living." This book would make an interesting text in an upper-
level undergraduate or graduate course in the philosophy of religion. It 
touches on many of the issues which are at the cutting edge of discus-
sion on the justification of religious belief, and moves that discussion 
forward in fresh and fascinating ways. 
The lead essays by William Alston and Alvin Plantinga are especially 
intriguing, and the collection is worth having for these alone. In "The 
Fulfillment of Promises as Evidence for Religious Belief," Alston argues 
that, within a kind of cumulative-case apologetics for Christianity, "the 
fulfillment of (alleged) divine promises of spiritual development by a 
large number of persons provides us with a significant reason for 
accepting the Christian belief system that involves the claim that such 
promises have been made" (p. 7). According to Christian teaching, God 
promises to reward those who are open, receptive, and obedient to him 
with growth in holiness, or what Alston sometimes calls "spirituality" or 
"sanctity." Alston concludes that the phenomenon of fulfilled promises 
is widespread enough that "it raises the probability of the system [of 
Christianity] sufficiently to be worthy of notice"(p. 12). Alston's case is 
perhaps strongest when the focus is on lives of the saints, since the spiri-
tual qualities of the saints are difficult to explain in purely natural psy-
chological terms. Many converts have reported that it was the character 
of the Christians in their acquaintance that was most decisive in their 
coming to faith, and one can see Alston's essay as making this move 
epistemically respectable. 
